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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOSE RICHARD QUINTANA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900264-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This brief is filed pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah R. 
App. P., in reply to the State's response brief. 
It should first be noted that the State, in its brief, 
has elected not to respond in any way to the arguments defendant 
raised in the Brief of Appellant. Thus, it should now be assumed 
by this Court that defendant's arguments and authorities 
asserting that the trial court failed to comply with the strict 
standards of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, ( 
in accepting defendant's plea, are well taken. Specifically, 
unopposed and not responded to are defendant's arguments that the 
trial court: (1) Failed to enumerate defendant's constitutional 
rights in accepting his plea; (2) failed to advise him that he 
could be sentenced consecutively for firearms enhancement; and 
(3) failed to advise him that he could receive a sentence running 
consecutively to the sentence he was presently serving. 
The sum total of these errors and omissions is that 
defendant's guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing and 
improperly received and, therefore, should be set aside. Failure 
to properly and completely adhere to Rule 11 results in a 
defective plea which must be set aside upon proper motion by 
defendant. State v. Gibbon, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah, 1987), State v. 
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App., 1989), and State v. Smith, 
777 P.2d 464 (Utah, 1989). 
The sole issue raised by the State (and raised for the 
first time on appeal) is that of jurisdiction. The State alleges 
that although there was no statute of limitation on withdrawal of 
guilty pleas at the time defendant entered his plea, a subsequent 
change in the statute which imposed a thirty-day limitation 
should have prohibited the lower court from even hearing the 
merits of defendant's claims. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is defendant's position that the provisions of §77-
13-6, Utah Code Ann., (as amended, 1989), which allegedly require 
that a motion to withdraw guilty plea be made within thirty days 
of the entry of the plea, is not jurisdictional. That statute 
must be read in conjunction and harmony with the provisions of 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was also amended 
in 1989. Rule 11(6) makes clear that the thirty-day period is 
not a hard and fast 'bright line' with which to gauge the 
timeliness of a motion to withdraw guilty plea, but is rather a 
period which can be extended and enlarged by a court. 
It is defendant's contention that the lower court 
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impliedly, if not necessarily, did, in fact, extend the time for 
raising the motion to withdraw the plea. If the court can, in 
its discretion, enlarge the time period, it clearly would not be 
jurisdictional. 
Further, it is defendant's contention that the rigid 
application of the thirty-day limitation to cases such as 
defendant's is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it denies the 
defendant's right to due process and his constitutional freedom 
from the application of ejc post facto laws. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE THIRTY-DAY TIME LIMIT FOR WITHDRAWING 
A GUILTY PLEA NOW CONTAINED IN §77-13-6, 
UTAH CODE ANN., (AS AMENDED, 1989), IS NOT 
JURISDICTIONAL 
§77-13-6(2), Utah Code Ann., (as amended, 1989) 
provides as follows: 
(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with 
leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest is made by motion, and 
shall be made within 30 days after entry of 
the plea. [Emphasis added.] 
The provision which imposes a thirty-day limitation on 
motions to withdraw guilty pleas is a new amendment to the former 
statute and became effective April 24, 1989. It has not yet been 
examined by this Court. At the time defendant entered his guilty 
plea in 1988, there was no statutory time period with regard to 
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such motions. The statute at that time read as follows: A plea 
of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good 
cause shown and with leave of [the] court." §77-13-6, Utah Code 
Ann., (as amended, 1980). 
The sole position taken by the State in their response 
brief is that the amended statute is jurisdictional. In order 
for a statute to be jurisdictional, it must be clear and definite 
as to its terms and restrictions. Statutes of limitation are 
almost always jurisdictional because they usually set clear 
'bright lines1 by which certain actions must be taken. If a 
litigant does not act within the time period set forth, the court 
is without jurisdiction to hear his claims, no matter how much 
merit they may have. 
§77-13-6, Utah Code Ann., (as amended, 1989), despite 
its appearance on its face, does not set a definite thirty-day 
period by which a motion must be filed or the court loses 
jurisdiction. Rule 11(6), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (as 
amended, 1989), provides as follows: 
Failure to advise the defendant of the time 
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea or no contest is not a ground for 
setting the plea aside, but may be the ground 
for extending the time to make a motion under 
§77-13-6. 
The new Rule 11(6) makes it clear that the court has 
authority to extend the time for making a motion under §77-13-6. 
If the thirty-day period was intended as jurisdictional, the 
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court would not have the power to extend the period and, thus, 
enlarge its own jurisdiction. The mere fact that the court on 
its own, or upon motion, may extend the time period indicates 
that it is a flexible period that can be expanded by the court to 
avoid manifest injustice such as would arise when a defendant was 
not informed of the thirty-day period. 
Just such a case is presented here. It is undisputed 
that at the time defendant's plea was accepted, he was not 
informed of any time period by which he must file a motion to 
withdraw his plea. This is true for the simple fact that there 
was no time limitation on motions to withdraw pleas at that time. 
Under Rule 11 as it now exits, the court has an affirmative 
obligation to instruct the defendant as to the time period in 
which a motion to withdraw his plea must be made. Under the 
present Rule 11(6), the failure to inform the defendant of the 
time period is not, in itself, grounds for setting aside his 
plea, but it is grounds for not imposing the thirty-day time 
period. 
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was 
argued at the lower court level where the State was represented 
by able and capable legal counsel. Although the new thirty-day 
limitation period imposed by the 1989 amendment to §77-13-6, 
could have been raised by the court or any of the parties, it was 
not. It is undisputed that the statute in effect at the time 
defendant filed his motion to withdraw his plea contained the 
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thirty-day limitation, yet none of the parties or the court felt 
it was controlling. Now, for the first time, the State, after a 
full evidentiary hearing at the lower court level, raises this 
issue on appeal. 
It is difficult to understand how the lower court and 
the parties could have overlooked this seemingly controlling 
statute which would have disposed of the defendant's motion 
summarily and without the need for an evidentiary hearing or the 
additional findings which were prepared by the court. It should 
not be assumed that the court was ignorant of the statute or that 
the parties overlooked it. While the record is not clear, the 
only explanation which makes sense is that the court implicitly 
found that defendant, having entered his plea when there was no 
statutory time limit and having not been previously informed or 
notified by the court of this new potential limitation on his 
rights, implicitly extended the time for the taking of his 
motion. This argument takes on added weight when one considers, 
as argued below, that strict application of that time period in 
defendant's case would be unconstitutional. Any other 
interpretation assumes gross ignorance of the law on the part of 
the trial court and incompetence of State's counsel at the 
hearing level. 
Should this Court have any doubt as to whether the 
lower court intended to expand the time period for withdrawing a 
plea (assuming the new time period is even applicable in this 
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case), it should remand this matter to the lower court for just 
such a determination, rather than deny this appeal based on 
jurisdictional grounds with an unclear record. This is 
especially true when this issue has been raised by the State for 
the first time on appeal and the lower court has thus been 
deprived of the opportunity to consider it. 
II 
THE APPLICATION OF THE THIRTY-DAY LIMITATION 
ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEAS, IN CASES 
SUCH AS AT BAR, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
As has been argued above, when defendant entered his 
guilty plea and was sentenced, there was no time limitation, 
either by statute, rule, or decision, limiting the time within 
which he could bring a motion to withdraw his plea. 
However, on April 24, 1989, an amendment to §77-13-6 
went into effect, imposing a thirty-day limitation within which 
motions to withdraw guilty pleas must be made. That thirty-day 
period began to run at the time the plea was entered. Thus, on 
its face, the moment the statute became effective, all pleas 
entered more than thirty days before the amendment would become 
final and not subject to motions to withdraw. 
The amended statute, by completely eliminating the 
right to set aside pleas entered more than thirty days prior, 
operates very much like a statue of repose which was declared 
unconstitutional in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 683 
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(Utah, 1985). 
The statute itself does not evidence any intent that it 
be applied retroactively to pleas entered before its enactment 
date. Utah law is clear that statutes are not applied 
retroactively unless they expressly so declare. §68-3-3, Utah 
Code Ann., (1953, as amended), provides as follows: "No part of 
these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared." 
To apply a criminal statute retroactively would 
constitute an e£ post facto law which is violative of Article 1, 
Section 10, of the Constitution of the United States, as well as 
Article I, Section 18, of the Utah Constitution, and runs 
contrary to long established prohibitions. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 
U.S. 167 (1925). There does not appear to be any difference in 
the nature or the scope of the prohibition under either the 
federal Constitution or the Utah Constitution. 
The ex post facto prohibition contained in both the 
federal and state Constitutions is based on consideration of 
notice and fair warning and, thus, although it is a separate 
constitutional protection, its intent and the cases interpreting 
it all deal with language and concepts similar to due process and 
equal protection. 
The United States Supreme Court has recently ruled in 
regards to £x post facto statutes. In Miller v. Florida, 482 
U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed. 2d 351 (1987), the Court 
8 
noted: 
Our understanding of what is meant by £x post 
facto largely derives from the case of Calder 
v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.ED. 648 (1798), in 
which this Court first considered the scope 
of the ex_ post facto prohibition. In Calder, 
Justice Chase ... summarized his under-
standing of what fell within the words and 
intent of the prohibition: 1st. Every law 
that makes an action done before the passing 
of the law, and which was innocent when done, 
criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. 
Every law that aggravates a crime or makes it 
greater than it was, when committed. 3d. 
Every law that changes the punishment, and 
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law 
annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th 
Every law that alters the legal rules of 
evidence, and receives less, or different 
testimony than the law required at the time 
of the commission of the offense, in order to 
convict the offender. Id., at 423. 
[Emphasis omitted.] [Citations omitted.] 
Under Miller, in order to fall within the eit post facto 
prohibition, two critical elements must be present: "...first, 
the law 'must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events 
occurring before its enactment'; and second, 'it must 
disadvantage the offender affected by it.'" Id., at 423. The 
application of the Miller test clearly reveals that the 1989 
amendment to §77-13-6 is an ex_ post facto provision as it is, on 
its face, retroactive and is most clearly disadvantageous to 
offenders such as defendant, who find their ability to bring such 
motions eliminated overnight and without notice. 
The State, in apparent anticipation of this 
constitutional argument, has argued that the amendment imposing 
the thirty-day limitation should be viewed as procedural in 
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nature and that "a procedural change is not j^ x post facto even 
though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant." Hopt v. 
Utah, 110, U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed 262 (1884). The 
fallacy of the State's argument is that it focuses only on the 
form of the statute and does not look at the nature of the right 
affected. The United States Supreme Court, in Miller, made this 
distinction clear when it held: 
...no e>x post facto violation occurs if the 
change in the law is merely procedural and 
does not increase the punishment, nor change 
the ingredients of the offense or the 
ultimate facts necessary to establish 
guilt... On the other hand, a change in the 
law that alters a substantial right can be ex 
post facto even if the statute takes a 
seemingly procedural form. Id., at 424. 
[Emphasis added.) [Citations omitted.] 
In like regard is Weaver v. Graham, 101 S.Ct. 960, 450 
U.S. 24, 67 L.Ed. 2d. 17 (1981), where the Court held, in regards 
to procedural/substantive distinction, that, "It is the effect, 
not the form of the law which determines whether it is ex^ post 
facto." 
The focus thus should be on the form of the statute and 
whether a substantial right of a criminal defendant has been 
effected. "A procedure change which does not injuriously effect 
a substantial right to which the accused was entitled as of the 
time of his offense is not ex^ post facto though retroactive; but 
is otherwise if it does deprive him of a substantial right." W. 
LeFave & A. Scott, Jr., "Substantive Criminal Law," 141 (West, 
1986). 
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Clearly, defendant has been denied a substantial right. 
At the time of his sentencing, he had the right, unrestricted by 
time, to withdraw his guilty plea upon a showing of good cause. 
After the enactment of the 1989 amendment, he no longer had that 
right because he had entered his plea more than thirty days prior 
to the enactment of the statute. While the statute would clearly 
be procedural as to future defendants and arguably procedural as 
to defendants whose thirty days had not run, it is quite clearly 
substantive as to defendants whose rights have been entirely 
eliminated by the statute. Their procedural rights as to the 
time period in which a motion should be filed is not effected, 
bur rather they are denied the substantive right to even file 
such a motion. 
The State, in response, quotes Vealey v. Clegg, 579 
P.2d 919 (Utah, 1978), for the proposition that, "limitation 
statutes ... are but procedural matters and are not 
constitutionally protected if they do not adversely effect vested 
rights." Id., at 920. The Vealey court, however, carefully 
conditioned this right upon the allowance of a grace period: 
...The law is all settled that statutes 
effecting limitation may be amended and 
shortened without impinging on any 
constitutional rights of a party, provided 
always that a sufficient period of grace is 
allowed to enable a plaintiff to maintain his 
cause of action if he will follow the new 
law... Id. [Emphasis added.] 
The State, in reference to the language regarding a 
grace period, boldly asserts that, "While the Vealey court spoke 
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of a grace period to allow a plaintiff to maintain his cause of 
action, that exact proviso is not required in all cases." Brief 
of Appellee at p. 6. No case authority is cited for that 
extraordinary and unwarranted conclusion. The Vealey court quite 
clearly stated that a "sufficient period of grace" must "always" 
be provided. Such a result is in harmony with the Utah Supreme 
Court's prior ruling in Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 
(Utah, 1975), where the Court held as follows: 
It is well established that the legislature 
may reduce a period of limitations and apply 
a new and shorter period to previously 
accrued causes of action, so long as a 
reasonable time is allowed to bring such an 
action; and that the effect of the new 
statute commences upon the effective date of 
the statute. The result of this is actually 
prospective in that the statutory change 
relates to procedure to occur in the future. 
Thus the plaintiffs had two years from the 
effective date of this statute or until May 
11, 1973, to assert their cause of action. 
This, coupled with the previously elapsed 
time, gave them forty plus months. So the 
period of the bringing of their action was 
shortened by a little over seven months; and 
the time available to them to bring their 
action after the new statute of limitations 
amply meets the requirement of allowing them 
reasonable time in which to do so. Id., at 
803. [Citations omitted.] 
In this case, in sharp contrast to Greenhalgh, no grace 
period was provided. With the 1989 amendment to §77-13-6, all 
pleas, entered more than thirty days prior to the effective date 
of the statute, became final and could not be subject to a motion 
to withdraw. Had the statute provided a grace period of even 
thirty days with appropriate notice for all prior pleas as well 
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as thirty days for prospective cases, it would pass constitu-
tional muster on the ex^ post facto basis. However, the complete 
avoidance of that issue makes the statute constitutionally 
defective. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the court did not strictly comply with Rule 11, 
the lower court had jurisdiction over defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. The State, by its silence, has 
conceded that the requirements of Rule 11 were not followed in 
this case. Such an error mandates allowing defendant to withdraw 
his plea of guilty. To hold otherwise ignores the purpose of 
Rule 11 and results in manifest injustice. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTEJKthjfS g^r^Zay of May, 1991. 
LE L. MOWER 
itTtorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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